

Make Peace.

**A Strategic Guide for
Achieving Lasting Peace in Israel**

Based on the Lubavitcher Rebbe's Teachings



**YONAH
PRESS**



SICHOS IN ENGLISH

MAKE PEACE

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*I will make peace in the land.
When you sleep, no one will make you afraid.
I will remove evil beasts from the land, and the sword
will not pass through your land.*

LEVITICUS 26:6

*The entire Torah was given to make peace in the world,
as it says,¹ “Its ways are pleasant,
and all of its paths are peace.”*

MAIMONIDES²

*I cry out because I am in pain.
And when it hurts, one screams!*

T H E R E B B E ³

*Each one of those murdered, G-d forbid,
is an entire world lost.*

T H E R E B B E ⁴

I am peace, but when I speak, they are for war.

PSALMS 120:7



Preface

SIMCHAS TORAH. One of the most joyous days on the Jewish calendar, Simchas Torah celebrates the deep bond between the Jewish people, G-d, and His Torah. However, on October 7, 2023, the holiday took a devastating turn.

As morning broke in Israel, soldiers began receiving urgent messages to report to their units. Many were sent into combat that day. Jews around the world, in the midst of rejoicing, began to hear disturbing rumors about events in the Land of Israel. We didn't know what to think. As the holiday ended and we turned on our phones, we were shocked and sickened by the things we read and the images we saw. We experienced indescribable pain when we heard what had happened to our families and friends, our brothers and sisters. We felt deeply uncertain about the long road that lay before us.

In the days following the October 7 massacres, we set out on a mission with the help of numerous Chabad institutions and emissaries worldwide, along with many other friends of Israel and the Jewish people. As disciples of the Lubavitcher Rebbe and expositors of his teachings, we began to mine the

countless pages and hundreds of hours of video and audio recordings of the Rebbe's teachings regarding Israel's security. Almost all of these were delivered in Yiddish or Hebrew.

We made it our task to distill the Rebbe's insights on the conflict over the Land of Israel, making them accessible and comprehensible to modern readers. Israel's security was a topic close to the Rebbe's heart, and he spoke about it passionately. Yet, his passion was coupled with a principled, rational approach to Israel's security. This approach, while deeply rooted in Jewish tradition, also reflected the facts on the ground.

We believe that the Rebbe's perspective is crucial for fostering an informed global dialogue, one that promotes lasting peace rather than ongoing conflict. This book aims to convey that perspective, highlighting how, sadly, many of the Rebbe's insights remain as relevant today as they were when first taught. We may have collectively failed to apply the Rebbe's approach in the past. However, history and recent events have shown how correct, even prophetic, his words were. The time to apply them is now.

We fervently pray that war altogether quickly becomes a relic of the past. At that time, war will serve solely as a metaphor for the spiritual battles associated with personal and collective growth, and dedication to serving G-d.⁵ Until then, it is imperative to adopt and disseminate the Rebbe's perspective on the struggle for the Land of Israel, as it holds the key to creating a lasting peace.

9 Adar Alef, 5784
[February 18, 2024]

I N T R O D U C T I O N

An Endless Cycle?

HAMAS' BRUTAL MASSACRE on October 7, 2023, shocked the world. Many condemned the Gazan terrorists for their unspeakable cruelty. Yet, Israel's enemies worldwide immediately took to the streets, first celebrating the attacks,⁶ and then demanding that Israel halt its response.

Those with limited historical awareness might see October 7's carnage as a singularly disturbing event. However, a broader view shows that it is part of a longstanding cycle of conflict. Although the names and forms of the groups hostile to Israel have changed over time – from fedayeen to Fatah, the PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization), Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah, and Iran – the conflict's fundamental nature remains unchanged. Tragically, every round of violence is more destabilizing than the last.

Looking at the broader picture, the October 7 attacks represent another chapter in the long history of antisemitism and, more generally, global terrorism. Israel's plight exemplifies the battle between order and chaos the world over.

Israel has gone to war to defend its people. The IDF's response, while portrayed in the media as barbaric, has been measured and disciplined.⁷ Yet, once again, global media coverage focuses on Israel while bloodier conflicts rage unnoticed. From Myanmar to Haiti, Syria to Ukraine, and Yemen to Azerbaijan, human rights violations, war, and famine abound.⁸ These fights over territorial claims, ethnic hostilities, or even more mundane gang violence, cause untold human suffering of greater magnitude than that in Israel and Gaza. Yet somehow, Israel takes the spotlight.

It feels like we have been here before. This is not the first time Israel has been targeted by terrorists, taken retaliatory measures, and faced international criticism. This raises the question: Is this just another phase in an endless cycle of violence, or is there a principled approach to end the cycle and achieve lasting peace?

The teachings of the Lubavitcher Rebbe, Rabbi Menachem Mendel Schneerson, one of the 20th century's premier Jewish leaders, offer insight into resolving this question. From 1951 until his passing in 1994, the Rebbe engaged with Israeli leaders of all types; Israeli Prime Ministers, politicians, diplomats, and security personnel all sought his counsel and blessing.⁹ From his public platform and in private meetings and letters, he articulated a clear vision for the Jewish state. The Rebbe offered a grand strategy: a comprehensive military and political analysis, as well as a vision for lasting peace.¹⁰

The Rebbe consistently highlighted the critical importance of religious conviction and psychological resilience alongside military action. He noted that history has

demonstrated how psychological vulnerabilities have led to setbacks, even when Israeli military power was formidable. From the outset, he focused on the necessity of psychological fortitude — the ability to withstand pressure and remain resolute until the end. This strength, he posited, is inextricably linked to *emunah* (faith) in G-d, adherence to Torah principles, and an unwavering belief in our right to the Land. The Rebbe emphasized that viewing the Torah not only as a transcendent holy text but as a practical guidebook, can profoundly influence our resilience and determination, offering concrete solutions to real-world issues.

The Rebbe's nuanced approach does not neatly fit into any political party's platform, nor can it be defined by classic left-right dichotomies. While some mischaracterize the Rebbe as a radical nationalist,¹¹ in fact, he sought harmonious coexistence for all parties involved in the conflict. He did not dehumanize the Jewish people's opponents, instead emphasizing that all people are created in G-d's image.

The Rebbe's position is deeply humanitarian. His care for all humanity outstrips simplistic narratives that offer quick fixes for peace. This explains why the Rebbe demanded that we develop an informed and rigorous position on how to achieve lasting peace. His critiques of entities like the U.N. or foreign governments stemmed not from cynicism, but from a realistic perspective and a sense of disappointment in their failure to fulfill their potential redemptive roles in fostering peace.

This book explores the conflict through the lens of the Rebbe's wisdom, addressing its key questions and offering principled solutions for its resolution.

PART 1

The Military Dimension

PART 1 explores the conflict's military dimension. The key question is: What techniques should we use to achieve peace? Ceasefires? "Land for Peace" deals? International peacekeepers? U.N. resolutions? Military responses?

Chapter 1 critically assesses seemingly kinder options such as ceasefires and Land for Peace negotiations. It explains why these are destined to fail, both from a theoretical standpoint and as demonstrated by historical evidence.

Chapter 2 discusses the Rebbe's advocacy of decisive military action based on a fusion of Jewish legal principles with realpolitik. He argued that strength and credible deterrence prevent war. If conflicts erupt, swiftly and relentlessly subduing opponents saves lives on both sides. While this assertive position may seem hawkish, it ultimately aims to minimize violence and restore stability.¹² Exercising military restraint might appear compelling at first, but if doing so leads to more bloodshed, it is not the truly peaceful solution.

PART 2

The Soul of the Conflict

PART 2 of the book delves into the ideological roots of the conflict. This includes the Jewish claim to the Land of Israel, the Rebbe's analysis of ideological warfare, and how Israel should articulate its position globally.

Chapter 3 presents a fundamental question: Given that the conflict centers around the Jewish people's presence in Israel,

do Jewish people have a right to be there to begin with? Perhaps they should go back to Moscow, Brooklyn, Egypt, Birobidzhan,¹³ or wherever else they came from. What is their claim to this land? The Rebbe considers several narratives and concludes that the Torah's narrative is the only one that can firmly establish our claim to the Land of Israel.

Chapter 4 argues that ideology shapes the conflict's outcome. To prevail, Israel must understand its opponents' ideology and bolster its own ideals. Otherwise, no matter how strong our military, the battle is lost. As devotion to religious principles increasingly drives our adversaries, Israel must reconnect to its spiritual heritage, prioritizing it over the pursuit of comfort. This requires robust Jewish education, from childhood onward, as well as encouraging *mitzvah* observance nationwide, especially among Israeli soldiers.

Having articulated the Jewish connection to the Land and the importance of ideological strength, Israel must also weigh global opinion. Israel increasingly fights its wars in the chambers of foreign governments, in the U.N., on the streets of major international cities, and on social media platforms. The international community has strong opinions about what Israel should do in the conflict. How should Israel respond? **Chapter 5** explains why Israel should politely but firmly insist on its security needs rather than fold under international pressure. We must cultivate confidence which we can draw from the Torah's ideals. **Chapter 6** lays out the Rebbe's view, that from the perspective of realpolitik, global disapproval need not deter Israeli determination.

The Rebbe's view is deeply grounded in Torah, ranging from Scripture to the Talmud, Maimonides, and the Code

of Jewish Law (*Shulchan Aruch*). However, diverse Jewish groups purportedly speak in the Torah's name, offering other solutions to the conflict. While by this point in the book, it will be clear that from the perspective of realpolitik these approaches do not work, **Chapter 7** will explore the Rebbe's response to those alternative perspectives.

PART 3

Domestic Security Policies

PART 3 tackles several practical policy questions. **Chapter 8** explores counterterrorism approaches, including the efficacy of prison time for terrorists, along with a halachic and strategic analysis of prisoner exchanges. **Chapter 9** discusses long-term Israeli governance of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza.

The focus of our study in this book extends beyond theory. We will conclude by examining the responsibility of every Jew, especially those living in the diaspora, to advocate for Israel.

The Key Principles: Pikuach Nefesh and Peace

The overriding halachic concern that will guide us in this work is *pikuach nefesh*, the principle that saving lives is the highest priority.¹⁴ So, we always need to ask, what strategy will save the most lives? The meta-halachic¹⁵ guiding principle here is peace.¹⁶ What can we do to achieve lasting peace?

We want something that will end the cycle and create peace on both sides.¹⁷ All human beings, even those who are fighting against us, are created in G-d's image.¹⁸ As such, every Jew has the responsibility to care for the lives of every person among the world's nations.¹⁹ As the Rebbe taught, though enemies threaten us, we should aim not to destroy them but to end their enmity. This follows our Sages' teaching to eliminate sins, not sinners²⁰ – so that one-time enemies will become friends.²¹

PART 1

The Military Dimension

CHAPTER 1

Simplistic Solutions For Peace

They say, "Peace! Peace!" But there is no peace.

- JEREMIAH, 8:11

They have misled my people saying, "Peace, peace," but there is no peace. They build a weak wall and plaster it flimsily.

- EZEKIEL, 13:10

IN ANY ARMED conflict, the most urgent dimension is the actual war. While ideology and politics are more fundamental, ending the war is most pressing to prevent further death and destruction. So, how do we end it? This section explores the problem, illustrating the dynamics of the cycle which Israel is locked in with its enemies.

Chapter 1 explores well-intentioned peace proposals such as immediate ceasefires, international mediation, and Land for Peace initiatives. While these suggestions are grounded in a desire for peace, historical evidence and military theory prove that these suggestions do not work in practice.

Chapter 2 explores the Rebbe's principled military formula to ending hostilities. This approach is carefully crafted to ensure that hostilities do not erupt to begin with, and to swiftly resolve them if they do. The Rebbe's principles are all rooted in *halachah* (Jewish law) and fused with military strategy and realpolitik.

Sketching the Cycle

Before our deep dive, let's sketch the cycle of conflict we seek to end. The 2023 Israel-Hamas War bears striking resemblance to most of Israel's major military engagements since 1982. If we examine the previous Gaza wars beginning soon after Israel's 2005 disengagement, and the two Lebanon wars, a familiar cycle emerges:

1) A terrorist group (PLO/ Hamas/ Hezbollah), embedded in a supportive civilian population, attacks Israel with a mix of killings, kidnappings, and long-range rocket fire.

2) Following severe attacks and heavy losses, Israel retaliates forcefully. A particularly severe incident provokes both domestic and international outcry.²²

3) Many countries, as well as the United Nations, rush to prevent Israel from attacking, citing the humanitarian

damage that an Israeli military response will inflict on the civilian population in which the terrorists are located.

4) Ignoring these protests, Israel attacks, grazing the terrorist organization, killing some of its operatives and leaders, destroying some weapons, and confiscating others. In the process, since these organizations are situated in densely populated urban areas, women, children, and noncombatants are unfortunately killed.

5) International media displays images of death, destruction, bombings, and crying children, provoking a widespread outcry over Israel's military response.

6) Israel begins to cave to international pressure, and shifts to waging a slow war. Restrained attacks are followed by ceasefires, which are then violated by the other side. In response, Israel retaliates once again. Yet, by this point, Israel's military efficacy has been blunted.

7) Finally, Israel relents to a full ceasefire.

8) The terrorist group declares victory, telling the population that its resistance caused Israel to capitulate.

9) The terrorist group fundraises for more advanced weapons, which it receives from anti-Israel entities. It recruits new militants to join its ranks.

10) The terrorist group begins firing rockets and initiating cross-border skirmishes.

11) Israel retaliates.

12) The cycle repeats.²³

If the current war ends similarly, we can reasonably expect another Gaza war a few years down the line. We can also expect that Israel's enemies elsewhere will be emboldened. War is terrible. Some who have strong partisan feelings may not feel the pain of those dying on the other side. They deserve it, they say. But for those who have human empathy, the tragic images on both sides evoke shock, compassion, and anger. Why can't it just stop? Let's begin by exploring some seemingly straightforward solutions to ending the violence.

SURELY THERE MUST be some easy, peaceful solution? Why do people have to be so cruel? This mindset leads well-intentioned people to propose solutions aimed at quickly resolving the conflict, restoring peace, and stopping the flood of horrific images.²⁴

Some such suggestions include:

- 1. Immediate ceasefire
(often under the slogan “Ceasefire Now”)**

- 2. Negotiations led by the international
community**

- 3. Deployment of peacekeeping forces**

- 4. Land for Peace**

Let’s examine each of these proposals by exploring the past conduct of terrorist groups along with the Rebbe’s perspective.

1. Ceasefire! (Now!)

An immediate ceasefire appears to be the most straightforward solution. The logic is simple: People are killing each other – so why not just **stop it**? Perhaps Hamas has committed violent acts against Jews, including massacring over one thousand and kidnapping hundreds. And they might have launched a few thousand rockets. Yet those events are in **the past**; stopping the violence now could prevent further suffering. Taking the high road might eventually lead to peace. Though this approach may sound appealing, there are several reasons to hesitate before implementing it:

A | Encouraging Future Attacks

Ceasefires can be perceived as tolerance of violence, inviting more severe atrocities in the future.²⁵ Moreover, Hamas' recent attacks gained significant publicity, making a ceasefire without decisive action against them a tacit victory. Furthermore, such a move would directly jeopardize Israeli security.

B | Ceasefire as a Tactical Pause

The underlying hope is that a ceasefire would pave the way to enduring peace. But will a ceasefire in Gaza truly lead to such peace? Let's consult the historical record. Ceasefires between Israel and Hamas are a fragile affair, with a short list including the ceasefires of June 2008, January 2009, November 2012, August 2014, June 2021, May 2023, and the "humanitarian pause" in late November 2023. On each of these occasions, Hamas broke the ceasefire. Given this impressive list of ceasefires made and subsequently broken, it appears that ceasefires do not achieve the intended outcome of fostering long-term peace.

Israel's interest in ceasefires clearly stems from a desire to protect its citizens from further harm. But what could be Hamas' motivation for a ceasefire? Rafael Eitan, an Israeli general who served in the 1982 Lebanon War, offered the following insight:

We again saw the well-known Middle Eastern tactic that has recurred in every battle and war. The moment an Arab country receives a heavy blow, the world wakes up and forces us to enter a ceasefire in order

*that we not achieve our objective.*²⁶

In Eitan's view, such ceasefires are not sincere attempts at peace, but rather a tool used by the enemy from a position of weakness to stop Israeli advances. Eitan further suggests that such hostile groups weaponize the "international community" to pressure Israel into agreeing to a ceasefire.

Let's imagine that terrorist groups propose ceasefires when they are at a disadvantage in order to ensure their survival. This is a logical survival tactic. But what follows next? Building the Gazan economy? Investing in tourism? Once again, examining the historical record will provide insight into the outcomes of ceasefires.

C | Time to Regroup:

Palestinian Terror Groups and Ceasefires

Israel's enemies utilize ceasefires as opportunities to regroup. So, ceasefires are not a recipe for peace, but rather for wars of attrition. The weaker side, in this case Hamas (but the same was true of Hamas' key terrorist predecessor, the PLO and all other skilled terrorist groups), uses ceasefires to prevent its destruction and to regroup.²⁷ Its purpose in doing so is to emerge more powerful in the future and thus inflict more serious damage on Israel. At the very least, it seeks to slowly damage Israel, sow terror in its communities, and harm Israel's public image, thereby weakening the country. Israel's enemies, in their various guises, have infinite patience.²⁸ As long as they just survive, they maintain the hope that, over time, they can sufficiently cripple

Israel until they finally annihilate it — either by slowly wearing down Israel's collective resolve, or by holding on long enough for geopolitics to shift.²⁹

D | The Insurgent's Playbook

One theme that we will return to in this study is that Hamas is best understood not as a localized phenomenon, but as a particular instance in the wider, general phenomenon of terrorist groups. While Western media tends to focus on Islamist terrorism, we have no shortage of other modern terrorist groups to consider. One crucial example of a hardened terrorist group that was ultimately defeated is the Tamil Tigers. For nearly thirty years, until their decisive defeat in 2009 by the Sri Lankan military, the Tamil Tigers perpetrated incessant acts of terrorism against the Sri Lankan people in a bid to create an independent Tamil state within Sri Lanka.

During the Sri Lankan Civil War (1983-2009), the Tigers requested ceasefires several times, often using the international community as leverage. The Tigers invariably³⁰ used the ceasefires as opportunities to rearm, consolidate their power, and ultimately weaken Sri Lanka. We should view Hamas' requests for ceasefires through this lens. Hamas may be cruel, but they are not stupid. Terrorism is a discrete political strategy, and we should expect terrorist groups to implement the strategy to the fullest.³¹ Ceasefires are an important weapon in any skilled terrorist's arsenal.³²

E | Cultural Precedent: *Hudna*

To better understand how Hamas employs ceasefires, it's important to consider some cultural context.³³ When Hamas and similar groups declare a ceasefire, they use the term “*hudna*,” roughly translated as a truce or a period of calm,³⁴ modeled on the Medieval “Treaty of Hdaybiyyah.”³⁵

The Treaty of Hdaybiyyah, intended to last ten years, held for only two, ultimately leading to the surrender of the originally more powerful party. This treaty served as precedent for Anwar Sadat's 1979 peace treaty with Israel.³⁶ On several occasions, Yasser Arafat, leader of the PLO, also compared his participation in the Oslo peace agreements with Israel to the Treaty of Hdaybiyyah.³⁷ The implication of these comparisons is that, from the Islamist perspective, peace agreements are regarded as temporary measures. Ceasefires are no different; they serve as strategic pauses, allowing time for the weaker side to regroup and ultimately gain the upper hand.³⁸

Hamas leaders have routinely offered *hudnas*. Notably, in 2004, Hamas leader Abdel Aziz al-Rantissi offered Israel a ten-year *hudna* in return for:

- 1) A complete Israeli withdrawal from Judea and Samaria.

- 2) The right of return for all Palestinian refugees.

- 3) The establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza.

However, he emphasized that this *hudna* would not imply Hamas' recognition of Israel. Instead, he offered the *hudna* as it would be "difficult to liberate all our land at this stage."³⁹ The phrase "all of our land" refers to the entire State of Israel.⁴⁰ Given this historical context, a *hudna* is a tool of war, used to pause the battle to regroup and destroy one's enemies.⁴¹

Let's now explore the Rebbe's explicit commentary on actual cases of ceasefire:

Ceasefire:

A Prelude to the Yom Kippur War

In 1970, after a three-year war with Israel known as the War of Attrition,⁴² Egypt proposed a ceasefire with Israel. The Rebbe offered the following insight into Egypt's motivation for the ceasefire:⁴³

Nasser wants a ceasefire as preparation for war. ... Any intelligent person understands that Egypt's sudden request for a ceasefire is not motivated by a desire for peace. A stable peace treaty can be discussed even during a war. Egypt wants a ceasefire since they cannot rebuild their fortifications and rearm while Israel is bombing.

The moment a ceasefire is signed, they will rebuild their fortifications along the Suez. Furthermore, a ceasefire will cause all of the money spent and soldiers' lives sacrificed

to be in vain, since Egypt will only regroup and return to attack us again. How can we justify the money we spent and the soldiers' lives we sacrificed? And how can we justify the future expenditures?

Israel says there is no reason for concern, since international peacekeepers will ensure that Egypt will not rearm and rearm during the ceasefire. Historical precedent, however, does not support this suggestion. In 1956, four countries promised to form a peacekeeping force at the border. Nasser eventually banished them, a move which ultimately paved the way for Egypt's belligerence leading up to the Six-Day War. During World War II, the defeated side⁴⁴ requested a ceasefire before entering into peace negotiations. The Allied military experts unanimously rejected this, explaining that a ceasefire would be used for rearmament. Moreover, they said, a ceasefire would lower the odds of lasting peace.

In fact, Nasser immediately violated the terms of the ceasefire, taking advantage of it to rearm Egypt, significantly bolstering their military position. This move played a crucial role when Egypt, under the leadership of Anwar Sadat, initiated the Yom Kippur War in 1973.⁴⁵

As early as 1970, the Rebbe saw the proverbial "writing on the wall": At the end of his discussion of Israel's unfortunate ceasefire with Egypt, the Rebbe broke down crying, citing the verse, "Why have I come, yet there is no one; I have called out, yet no one answers."⁴⁶

Ceasefire in Lebanon: From Defeat to a War of Attrition

While many of the concerns we noted above demonstrate how terrorist groups can leverage ceasefires for long-term military gains, these ceasefires also provide them with immediate benefits. For instance, when a terrorist group is faced with imminent defeat, a ceasefire can halt military advancements against them and prevent their total eradication.

Terrorists can manipulate the international community into enforcing a ceasefire, thus halting the enemy's advance. The terrorists then have the opportunity to violate the ceasefire by attacking their opponents while still within enemy territory awaiting negotiations. When their opponents subsequently retaliate, the terrorists can appeal to the international community for yet another ceasefire. Later in the book, we will delve deeper into how the PLO used this very tactic against Israel during the First Lebanon War.⁴⁷

Summary

We see, then, that there are at least five compelling reasons for skepticism about the effectiveness of ceasefires:

A | Ceasefires demonstrate a tolerance for violence.

B | Ceasefires are a tool that allows terrorist groups to survive, regroup, and rearm.

C | Ceasefires are a classic insurgent tool used in modern warfare to weaken states, irrespective of cultural context.

D | In Hamas' cultural context, ceasefires have a clear precedent as an implement of war.

E | Ceasefires not only dishonor the memory of the fallen, but also squander the funds spent on defense.

If this is the case, we see that:

1) A ceasefire is not in Israel's interest.

2) Those calling for a ceasefire are either unintentionally or intentionally seeking to strengthen Israel's enemies.

So, we see that a ceasefire will only perpetuate the cycle of violence by allowing Hamas, or some more violent successor, to survive and fight another day. If we aim to end the cycle of violence and allow both Jews and Palestinians to lead prosperous, happy, terror-free lives, then a ceasefire, no matter how initially attractive it may seem, is not the answer. But what if we modified the ceasefire? What if, instead of an unconditional ceasefire, the international community and the U.N. would monitor and enforce the ceasefire?

2. Appealing to the International Community for Support

The international community seems to have tremendous sympathy and concern for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. International media discusses it endlessly, and leaders the world over opine freely on the conflict and offer to help resolve it in some way. Surely, the international community would like to see a reduction in Israeli and Palestinian casualties, along with peace and prosperity in the region. Perhaps, instead of merely pushing for a ceasefire, the international community should mediate the ceasefire's outcome.

The Rebbe viewed this approach skeptically. He observed that those urging Israel to exercise restraint often do not apply the same standards to themselves. When Israel retaliates in response to attacks, these international voices criticize the response, urging Israel to seek legal recourse through organizations like the U.N. This, according to the Rebbe, is impractical and ineffective. Such organizations, which are usually biased against Israel to begin with, rarely reach meaningful, conclusive, verdicts, and do not enforce anything of consequence. The enemy, emboldened by this indecisive response, continues their aggression, expecting nothing more than symbolic condemnation. Consider the following talk by the Rebbe, delivered in 1969, that sounds very apropos to 2024:⁴⁸

Very often, those who ask Israel to exercise restraint are "G-d fearing."⁴⁹ They are religious and study the Bible, and tell us to "turn the other cheek." They hold us to this

standard, but they themselves do not “turn the other cheek” in similar circumstances. When we retaliate, they complain, “How can you retaliate? Doing so is unjust! Instead, you must first turn to the court of law. Come to the U.N., and there the ‘righteous’ and ‘just’ people will gather. They will decide the fate of those who shot and shelled the Jewish people. But you should forgive the aggressors in the meantime.”

The Torah tells us not to follow this reasoning! Moreover, this response is damaging not only to the Jews, but also to those who wish to kill them, because it encourages continued violence. When someone knows full well that he intends to kill you, and you respond by sending him a letter saying, “Listen here, Mr. Cossack, you should know that your intention to strike the Jews is against the U.N. Charter. You must therefore first ask for permission from the U.N. General Assembly, who will have one meeting and then another meeting, where they will decide on having another meeting.” This will only encourage further violence.

Of course, they have already started attacking, and they continue to continue doing so; all they expect is a mere censure: “Listen here, Mr. Cossack, you did something against the Charter...” The inevitable result is that the enemy will attack the Jews with impunity, and then will focus his attention on attacking non-Jews in the world at large.

Israel’s enemies have taken millions of dollars in foreign aid from Western countries. However, when these countries criticize their violent behavior, Israel’s enemies continue

with their attacks and “blow off” the complainants. The complaints get sent to ineffective organizations such as the International Court of “Justice” at the Hague. Meanwhile, the enemies continue their attacks, they continue receiving international funding, and they make a mockery of international peacekeepers. When the international community complains about atrocities of terrorists committed against the non-Jewish world, they should consider – where were you when the terrorists targeted the Jews?! When terrorists attacked the Jews, you said that the Jews needed to send a formal complaint through the foreign minister and consider the U.N.’s protocol with its endless meetings. Why, then, are you [i.e., the international community] surprised that the terrorists laugh at you and take your money?!

Here, the Rebbe highlights the comical corruption or ineptitude of the U.N. and international mediation, and thus its futility. Instead of relying on the international community, the Rebbe encourages adopting a proactive military stance:

*Therefore, given this absurdity, the Torah says, and quite rationally so, that when someone comes to kill you, you should not reason with him, but instead, “rise up to kill him!” The principle specifically says “rise up **to** kill him,” not [i.e., as opposed to] “rise up **and** kill him.” The idea here is that simply by adopting this attitude, you will not need to actually kill him (since he will have been deterred).*

This proactive military stance will ensure Israel’s security. Israel’s enemies can send in their complaints to the U.N, as the Rebbe continues:

If he sees that you have awoken at the crack of dawn not to write letters to the U.N., but instead to be on the alert to kill him if he tries to kill you, then he will not attempt to attack you to begin with. He can send his complaints against you to the U.N. Then you can be sure that one year will pass, and then another year, and then a “new king will arise” with “new laws.”⁵⁰ In the interim, “the Guardian of Israel does not sleep or slumber.”⁵¹ Your enemies will send new complaints to the U.N., and the old complaints will be forgotten.

3. Peacekeeping by the International Community

But still, a proactive military stance does seem quite threatening. If mediation does not work, perhaps ceasefires are best **enforced** by international peacekeeping military units. Let’s examine the historical record and ponder how well this suggestion has worked for Israel in the past:

A | War with Egypt

In 1956, the Suez Crisis broke out.⁵² Egypt, under the leadership of President Gamel Abdel Nasser,⁵³ blocked the straits of Tiran, an important international shipping route. Taking this as an act of war, Israel, together with the United Kingdom and France, invaded the Sinai Peninsula (then held by Egypt), with the goal of reopening the route. While initially successful, under pressure from the United States⁵⁴ and Russia, the invading forces withdrew. In the aftermath, the United Nations Emergency Force

(UNEF) was deployed to the Sinai Peninsula to keep the peace between Israel and Egypt.⁵⁵

UNEF remained in the Sinai Peninsula until 1967, when Egypt asked it to evacuate. It summarily did so, highlighting its (in)effectiveness in preventing conflict.⁵⁶ Egypt, then left unchecked, massed troops to invade Israel. Israel preemptively struck Egypt in what became known as the Six-Day War. After the Six-Day War, Israel and Egypt would go on to fight two more wars, until finally signing a peace treaty in 1979, followed by a tenuous, cold peace.⁵⁷ U.N. Peacekeeping Forces did not bring about this outcome, instead, Israeli triumph on the battlefield did. This led Egypt to realize that further conflict with Israel was not in its interest.⁵⁸

B | Terror from Lebanon

If the United Nations Peacekeeping Forces were ineffective in Israel and Egypt's wars, in the case of Lebanon they have been even more troublesome. Lebanon, Israel's northern neighbor, has been a failed state for decades, with a weak government, rife with civil wars, foreign invasions, and general factional unrest.

In 1971, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the primary Palestinian group terrorizing Israel at the time, was evicted from Jordan after threatening to assassinate the Jordanian King and fomenting the Jordanian Civil War. The PLO moved to Southern Lebanon, exerting military control over the region. They subsequently used this area as a base for attacks on Northern Israel. Here they continued their dual policy: running a military operation

clashing with their host state, and simultaneously using their host state as an operations base to attack Israel.

In 1978, the PLO carried out the brutal Coastal Road massacre.⁵⁹ They hijacked a bus on the Israeli Coastal Highway, murdering 38 Israeli civilians, including 13 children, and injuring 76. In response, Israel launched Operation Litani⁶⁰ against PLO bases in Lebanon, but held back from totally wiping out the PLO, illustrating the cycle we noted at the beginning of this work. The U.N. solemnly called upon Israel to immediately withdraw its troops and established UNIFIL (United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon).⁶¹ UNIFIL's stated goal was to secure the South Lebanese border and prevent additional terrorist infiltration into Israel, thus preventing Israeli reprisals.

Independently of UNIFIL's presence and of the Israel-PLO conflict, Lebanon was internally suffering from a fifteen-year civil war between Christian and Muslim factions, as well as from war with Syria who, depending on the period, supported different sides of the conflict. The PLO instigated the Lebanese Civil War, and simultaneously continued to attack Israel, even with UNIFIL's presence. Moreover, UNIFIL impeded Israel's response to PLO terrorism against Israel so as not to endanger UNIFIL peacekeepers in the crossfire.⁶²

In June 1982, Israel finally invaded Southern Lebanon with the intention of neutralizing the PLO. Three months into fighting a stop-and-go war, Israel finally struck the PLO hard enough that their leadership agreed to evacuate Lebanon.

In 1985, three years after the PLO's ejection from Lebanon,⁶³ a new, more formidable militant group, the Iran-backed Hezbollah, arose. While Israel and its Lebanese-Christian allies initially contained Hezbollah, with Israel's withdrawal in 2000, Hezbollah's power greatly increased.

Hezbollah began to fire rockets at Northern Israel and conduct cross-border raids, leading Israel to retaliate with the Second Lebanon War in 2006. The war was waged with the aim of neutralizing Hezbollah as a threat once and for all. The U.N. imposed a ceasefire,⁶⁴ solemnly calling for Hezbollah's disarmament, meant to be overseen by UNIFIL.⁶⁵ However, since 2006, instead of disarming, Hezbollah has become a far more formidable threat, with many more, better trained fighters, and a large arsenal of missiles and rockets capable of reaching anywhere in Israel.⁶⁶

Presently, despite UNIFIL's presence in Lebanon for over four decades and countless ceasefires brokered by the U.S. and the U.N., Israel is in a worse security position vis-à-vis Lebanon than ever before. This state of affairs leads many intelligence experts to see a **third** full-scale Lebanon War as inevitable in order to neutralize Hezbollah's threat.⁶⁷

Summing up the U.N.'s prodigious record of failure with respect to Israel, the Rebbe said: "We do not want the false consolation of the U.N.'s 'sword of peace.' Heaven save us from the way they guarded us in Lebanon, and earlier, at the Suez Canal and in the Sinai desert..."⁶⁸

C | Syria's Intervention in the Lebanese Civil War

Israel did not primarily bear the brunt of the Lebanese Civil War; the Lebanese people did. Towards the beginning of the Lebanese Civil War (1975-1990), in 1976, Syria invaded Lebanon. Syria ostensibly intervened to prevent the Lebanese government's collapse and to maintain a balance between the warring factions, including Christian militias, Palestinian groups, and Lebanese Muslim factions. However, Syria's true motives were less humanitarian and more strategic, aiming to exert influence over Lebanon and **prevent the rise of a Palestinian state** which could challenge Syrian authority in the region.

During this intervention, Syria slaughtered noncombatant men, women, and children on a daily basis. This was no secret. Although the U.N. and other nations vehemently protested Syria's actions, they did not do anything to end the violence. No one came to Lebanon's rescue. **Practically**, no one cared.⁶⁹

The Rebbe asks us to imagine, then, how seriously Israel should consider international assurances of aid if it were in crisis. Given the international community's bleak, unreliable track record, continuing to this day, the Rebbe counsels against relying on it.⁷⁰ Hamas remains undeterred by U.N. condemnations such as Former Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon's proclamations that their attacks were "shocking,"⁷¹ or by current Secretary-General António Guterres' belated expression of being "appalled" by Hamas' kidnappings.⁷² Often, the U.N. and the international community either overlook these attacks⁷³ or respond with ineffective statements,

devoid of substantial action. These examples show that Israel cannot depend on U.N. peacekeeping missions to ensure stable ceasefires, as peace or war often hinge on more complex factors. To underscore this, let's examine one notable example of U.N. peacekeeping failure from among many around the world.

D | UNAMIR and the Rwandan Genocide

For centuries, two primary ethnic groups have lived in Rwanda, the Hutu and Tutsi. In 1962, following a revolution, the Rwandan government switched from Tutsi to Hutu control. Exiled Tutsis formed a militarized political movement⁷⁴ with the goal of restoring Tutsi control. In 1990, the Tutsis invaded, sparking a civil war that lasted until 1993, when the hostilities temporarily ceased with the signing of the Treaty of Arusha. Subsequently, the U.N. dispatched UNAMIR (United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda) to keep the peace in Rwanda. In 1994, over a period of several months, armed Hutu militias slaughtered over 500,000 Tutsis, while UNAMIR's forces helplessly looked on.

Summary

Israel's experiences with international peacekeeping forces indicate that they are unhelpful, and sometimes even detrimental, often facilitating the operation of terrorist groups. Rwanda's experience further illustrates how relying on international peacekeeping is a risky gamble. So, it is clear that international efforts, highlighted by U.N. peacekeeping, will not end the cycle.⁷⁵ As the Rebbe put it many times, our

goal is to manifest G-d's blessing of "I shall set peace upon the Land... and the sword [i.e. armies] shall not pass through your land"⁷⁶ not even "the sword of peace [i.e. armies that come in peace],"⁷⁷ such as U.N. peacekeepers.⁷⁸

4. Land for Peace

Perhaps the key to ending the cycle is not merely stopping to fight, but identifying and resolving the underlying issues in the conflict. Many cite Palestinian desire for statehood and self-determination as the core reasons for the current conflict.

At the start of the 2023 conflict, influential global leaders stated that after the war, lasting peace can only be achieved through a two-state solution. Some of these include the President of the United States, Joe Biden;⁷⁹ the Secretary of State, Antony Blinken;⁸⁰ the U.N. Secretary-General, António Guterres;⁸¹ Russian President, Vladimir Putin;⁸² and Chinese President, Xi Jinping.⁸³

Examining the Potential Partners

To test this proposition, let's look at the positions of Israel's opponents, and consider whether a two-state solution would end the conflict and save Jewish and Arab lives. If we examine the emblems of all major Palestinian groups, we find that they all contain a striking feature: every one contains an image of Israel's entire territory. This is true not only of the Islamist Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), but also of the purportedly moderate Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and its subsidiary Fatah.⁸⁴

This striking fact indicates that these groups aspire to control **all** of Israel's land; Israeli withdrawals from Judea, Samaria, and even Jerusalem will not satisfy their demands. These groups hold all the political power in Palestinian autonomous regions, with Hamas ruling Gaza and tolerating PIJ presence, and the PLO/Fatah ruling cities with Palestinian majorities in Judea and Samaria such as Bethlehem, Hebron, Nablus (Shechem), and Ramallah.

Micah Goodman, a contemporary Israeli scholar, notes that “ending the occupation” carries different meanings for different groups. For the Israeli left, ending the occupation means Israel's withdrawal from Judea and Samaria. However, for supporters of the Palestinian narrative, it implies the complete dissolution of Israel as a state, and Arab reoccupation of cities like Safed, Tel Aviv, Ashkelon, and Haifa.⁸⁵

Beyond merely examining flags, a closer look at the preamble to the Hamas Charter⁸⁶ can offer more insights – there we read:

Palestine is a land that was seized by a racist, anti-human, and colonial Zionist project that was founded on a false promise (the Balfour Declaration), on recognition of a usurping entity, and on imposing a fait accompli by force. Palestine⁸⁷ symbolizes the resistance that shall continue until liberation is accomplished, until the return is fulfilled, and until a fully sovereign state is established with Jerusalem as its capital.

It's difficult to imagine a group with such a mission statement making peace if given some land.

Another interesting fact to consider is that over the past 50 years, the Arab leaders in Hebron have either been directly

involved in the murder of Jews or are closely related to those who have been.⁸⁸ The current mayor of Hebron, Tayseer Abu Sneineh,⁸⁹ who has been in office since 2017, was previously sentenced to life imprisonment for his role in an attack that resulted in the death of six Jewish civilians and injured twenty others. He was later released in a prisoner exchange. Despite Sneineh's murderous past and his continued lectures and tours on the attack, he does not seem to have been disqualified from leadership in Palestinian public opinion.⁹⁰

Looking further at Palestinian leadership, Mahmoud Abbas, chairman of the Palestinian Authority, and seen as a moderate by the West, is not a credible peace partner, given his history of Holocaust denial⁹¹ and recent provocative comments since October 7.⁹²

There are no other significant Palestinian political groups, and both Hamas and Fatah have a taste for one-party rule. New elections have not been held since 2006 soon after Israel's unilateral withdrawal from Gaza, and Hamas and Fatah fought a bloody civil war in 2007, culminating in Hamas evicting Fatah from the Gaza Strip.⁹³ With these facts in mind, it is difficult to identify a viable counterpart with whom Israel could negotiate a two-state solution to bring about peace.⁹⁴

What about Hezbollah or Iran? If Israel were to enter into Land for Peace negotiations, would Hezbollah or Iran cease fighting it? Hezbollah — affiliated news outlets, such as Al-Ahed⁹⁵ and Al-Manar,⁹⁶ label the entire State of Israel as “the temporary entity.” Al-Ahed describes the residents of Northern Israel, an area recognized as part of Israel in the

1948 United Nations Partition Plan, as “settlers,” and refers to Israeli cities and towns in this region as “settlements.”⁹⁷ Similarly, Iranian news outlets refer to the entire Israel as the “oppressive and arrogant enemy” and a “child-killing Zionist” regime.⁹⁸ They praise Palestinian attacks on Israel and describe the “occupied territories” (including Sderot, Be’er Sheva, Ashkelon, and Tel Aviv) as having been turned into “hell for the Zionists.”⁹⁹ This rhetoric demonstrates that they do not recognize the legitimacy of any part of Israel, suggesting that Hezbollah or Iran would likely continue fighting Israel even if it gave up land for peace.

What about Islamists across the world? Consider Osama Bin Laden’s thoughts on the matter:

*If you want a real settlement that guarantees your security in your country and safeguards your economy... then you have to implement a roadmap that returns the **Palestine land** to us, all of it, from the sea to the river; it is an Islamic land not subject to being traded or granted to any party.*¹⁰⁰

Clearly, while many in the Western world distinguish between Judea and Samaria and the territory the U.N. granted to Israel in 1948, Israel’s most concerning enemies do not make this distinction.

Historical Context

Let’s examine the historical record. Arabs have perpetrated sporadic pogroms against Jews in the Land of Israel for over a thousand years.¹⁰¹ Yet, Arab political violence against Jews in the Land of Israel only began in earnest in the 1920s with the arrival of larger numbers of Jews from abroad,

many fleeing violence and antisemitism in Europe. The Arabs argued that the increasing number of Jews and their ambitions for statehood provoked the violence.

Between 1920 and 1948, Arabs in Israel staged several riots and attacks against Jews. Perhaps most notable is the 1929 Hebron massacre, when Arabs brutally attacked the Jewish community, massacring 67 Jews, mutilating and raping¹⁰² many, and injuring 58.¹⁰³ We thus see how Arab political violence against Jews predated the founding of the State. Since 1948, when the newly-formed State of Israel repelled attacks from five different Arab armies,¹⁰⁴ it has faced a steady stream of attacks by various terrorist groups. Fatah, formed in 1959, carried out its first attack against Israel in 1965, two years before Israel gained control of Judea and Samaria from Jordan, and Gaza from Egypt in the Six-Day War.¹⁰⁵

Terrorism against Jews in the Land of Israel has existed long before the State of Israel's establishment and before Judea and Samaria came under Jewish control. Why, then, would giving up Judea and Samaria resolve the issue? It seems this suggestion is either deliberately misleading or reflects arrogance on the part of Western powers seeking easy solutions to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Palestinian responses to the two-state solution typically fall either into outright rejection (Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Hezbollah) or lukewarm and fickle acceptance (PLO) without committing to any proposal.

Withdrawal and Autonomy

It seems that there's no viable peace partner for a two-state

solution. Moreover, Israel's opponents have voiced their aspiration for a single state called Palestine, encompassing all of Israeli territory. Given this backdrop, what steps could lead to peace short of the Jewish people leaving Israel altogether? Perhaps leaving Judea, Samaria, and Gaza would result in peace, giving the Arabs in the Land of Israel a sense of autonomy and self-determination. It would lead to a cessation of terror and the emergence of a flourishing economy alongside Israel. To assess this possibility, let's revisit the historical record and see if this has worked in the past.

The Oslo Accords

In 1993, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzchak Rabin signed the Oslo Accords with Yasser Arafat, leader of the PLO. The Accords offered Palestinian autonomy in areas with Palestinian majorities, including Gaza, Jericho, Hebron, Nablus (Shechem), and Ramallah. However, the Oslo Accords did not lead to peace; instead, terrorist attacks escalated, culminating in the Second Intifada, which lasted from 2000-2005.¹⁰⁶

The Second Intifada, marked by a surge in terrorist attacks, (including widespread suicide bombings), saw various PLO groups¹⁰⁷ and Hamas as particularly violent contributors. History demonstrates that concessions lead to more violence.¹⁰⁸ The intifada did not end with concessions, but with decisive Israeli military action in Operation Defensive Shield.¹⁰⁹ In this operation, the IDF raided Palestinian areas granted autonomy, arresting terrorists and seizing weapons.¹¹⁰ Rather than fostering peace, the autonomy allowed Palestinian areas to become bases for attacks against Israel. The intifada only ended with intensive Israeli military action and

the construction of security barriers in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, which effectively prevented terrorist infiltration.

This context also explains why the security barriers surrounding Gaza and parts of Judea and Samaria are not “apartheid walls.” These barriers did not exist when Israel conquered the territory from Jordan in 1967, and although Israelis were suspicious of the Arab population who had either supported or actively participated in violence against Israelis, there was a general optimism amongst Israelis for peace and collaboration. Israel only constructed the security barriers in response to relentless terrorist attacks and suicide bombings.

The Gaza Disengagement

In 2003, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharonⁱⁱⁱ proposed a unilateral disengagement from Gaza, which would involve removing all Jewish settlements and handing full control of the area over to the Palestinians. Executed in 2005, this plan forcibly evicted 8,000 Jews from their homes and demolished their communities. The following year, Hamas won the Palestinian elections and violently ousted Fatah, turning Gaza into a base for ongoing attacks against Israel. The disengagement did not bring peace; instead, Gaza became a haven for groups like Hamas and PIJ, posing a significant threat to Israel.

It seems, then, that Land for Peace is a failed policy. But what if Israel simply is just not giving up enough land? Maybe if it gave away all of Judea and Samaria, Israel’s enemies would be mollified, and everyone could just live in peace.

Ceding Judea and Samaria

As previously noted, the emblems of all major Palestinian groups contain the image of the entire Land of Israel. This indicates that they will not be satisfied until they have it all. Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, then, are at best a red herring, or a tool that can be used to incrementally achieve the goal of domination.¹¹² What if Israel were to give up Judea and Samaria? At the moment, the PLO controls the West Bank and, while corrupt,¹¹³ it cooperates with Israel to some degree.¹¹⁴ Nonetheless, even the “moderate” PLO has a “pay for slay” policy, offering stipends to families of suicide bombers and others who murder Jews.¹¹⁵ Yet, even the PLO may only be able to maintain power backed as it is by Israeli military presence in Judea and Samaria. Should Israel withdraw, a Palestinian civil war, the likes of the 2007 Palestinian Civil war in Gaza, might occur, in which case Hamas could take control.

Even if Hamas were not to take control, many independent terrorist groups flourish in Judea and Samaria, including (but not limited to) the Tulkarm Brigade, Lion’s Den, Jenin Brigades, and Tubas Brigade.¹¹⁶ This places Israel in a precarious position. While withdrawing from Judea and Samaria might bring peace in some possible “ideal” world, that possible world appears quite distant from the real world. If Judea and Samaria were to become terror bases similar to Gaza, Israel would be in serious trouble. Rockets and cross-border attacks would be much more damaging and would undermine Israel’s security, crippling its economy and transforming the entire state into a war zone.

Land for Terror: A Counterintuitive Phenomenon

In the long history of Land for Peace, the doctrine has only brought terrorism, not peace.¹¹⁷ Instead of ending the cycle of conflict, Land for Peace exacerbates it. Both Israelis and Palestinians are less safe since the Oslo accords and the Gaza disengagement. And Palestinians are now more likely to be killed, either by Hamas¹¹⁸ or by Israel retaliating against Hamas attacks.¹¹⁹ As the Rebbe observed:¹²⁰

We once thought that if the Arabs were to hear that we are planning to give away land, there would be quiet. But instead, the moment Israel spoke about returning land, terrorist attacks began to proliferate. The number of terrorist attacks dramatically increased after the signing of the Camp David Accords.

Land for Peace inspires further terrorist attacks, as the ultimate objective on the Islamist side is to completely undermine the Jewish state and replace it with an Islamist one.¹²¹ If Israel stands strong, then the Palestinian population will let go of its territorial ambitions and pursue productive endeavors instead of terror.¹²² If, however, Israel shows weakness and readiness to compromise, then, as history proves, it will only invite more terrorist attacks and incite further conflict.¹²³

Whenever Israel offers a conciliatory approach, it undermines its citizens' security. Then, it is forced into a catch-22. It can either allow its citizens to be killed, or it can offer a forceful response. In practice, the government tacitly allows a certain number of its citizens to be killed.¹²⁴ This goes on until public opinion generates too much

outrage, at which point the government retaliates. This retaliation, however, is bloodier than it would have been had the government responded sooner. Nonetheless, the government still somewhat tolerates terrorist activity, thus emboldening terrorists and their supporting communities. Consequently, the Israeli army is forced to fight a stronger enemy, but restrained from entirely neutralizing it.

Thus, a cycle perpetuates. Arabs teach anti-Israel ideology and radicalize their youth.¹²⁵ The youth are continually indoctrinated with this ideology, leading some to carry out acts of terror. The army arrests the terrorists (most of the time) and sends them to prison, where they sit until they are possibly freed in a prisoner exchange. This education creates a large hostile population, where many have the general belief that terrorism pays.¹²⁶ They want to establish a Palestinian state “from the river to the sea,” and each attack is a step towards realizing that goal.

The cycle would quickly end if Israel adopted a zero-tolerance policy for terrorism.¹²⁷ Following this policy, terrorists would be neutralized.¹²⁸ The Israeli military would respond forcefully and decisively to any terrorist attack.¹²⁹ Thus, terrorists and the communities that support them will learn that terrorism does not pay. Terrorism will only hurt them and their communities. They can either enjoy the benefits of living in Israel, or relocate to some other country where they can experience self-determination.¹³⁰

Outside of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the doctrine of “Land for Peace” is unheard of. Historically, when a country wins territory in a defensive war, they retain the territory. Land for Peace seems to be a construct specially invented

to territorially diminish Israel.¹³¹ It is a failed experiment. The ideal premise of Land for Peace is: Israel granting the Palestinians greater autonomy, followed by increased cooperation from the Palestinians, which then prompts Israel to offer even further autonomy. Instead, the cycle has been: Israel offering more autonomy, Palestinians exploiting the autonomy to perpetrate more violence, inviting Israel to retaliate to stop the violence. Consequently, Land for Peace and attempts at a two-state solution are not the elusive solution we need to end the cycle and **make peace**.

Conclusion

What, then, is the solution? It would seem that the various Palestinian terror groups, along with Iran and Hezbollah, would all like Israel to close up shop and turn the Land of Israel into the Islamic Republic of Palestine. Will Jews be allowed to live in this Republic or will they be expelled to the West or Birobidzhan?¹³² What would life for the Palestinian residents of the Republic look like? To understand why this is an untenable option, we need to consider our rights to the Land, a point we will explore in Part 2.

If we remain in Israel, what can we do to end the cycle and achieve lasting peace? In what follows, we will explore three halachic principles fundamental to the Rebbe's approach to this question. While purely halachic, these principles firmly cohere with those of realpolitik and with military tactics used in counterterrorism since the dawn of post World War II insurgencies.¹³³

Endnotes

- 1 Proverbs 3:17.
- 2 *Mishneh Torah, Hilchos Chanukah*, 4:14.
- 3 *Karasi V'Ein Oneh*, Vol. 1, p. 475, 20 Menachem Av 5739 (1979); Vol. 2, pp. 207-208, 24 Teves 5742 (1982); p. 321, 19 Kislev 5743 (1982); Video of *Sichah* [<https://videos.jem.tv/video-player?clip=735>]; Audio of *Sichah* [<https://ashreinu.page.link/8ZXb>]; pp. 348-349, *Mikeitz* 5744 (1983).
- 4 *Toras Menachem* 5742, Vol. 3, p. 1724, 3 Tammuz 5742 (1982); *Karasi V'Ein Oneh*, Vol. 2, pp. 230, 234, 236, 247; Video of *Sichah* [<https://jemtv.page.link/6AzU>]; Audio of *Sichah* [<https://ashreinu.page.link/3XKE>].
- 5 See, for example, the Mittlerer Rebbe's *Shaarei Teshuvah*, p. 49ff.; *Sefer HaMaamarim* 5659, pp. 161-175 (Kehot 2011); *Toras Menachem - Sefer HaMaamarim Melukat*, Vol. 2, p. 150; *Toras Menachem - Derushei Chassunah*, pp. 244-247; *Toras Menachem - Hisvaaduyos* 5747, Vol. 2, p. 78.
- 6 One particularly outspoken anti-Israel advocate distilled this sentiment describing the massacres as “exhilarating” and “energizing”.
- 7 The IDF Approach to Protecting Civilians in Urban Warfare – Modern War Institute [<https://mwi.westpoint.edu/the-idf-approach-to-protecting-civilians-in-urban-warfare/>]; Urban Warfare | INSS [<https://www.inss.org.il/wp-content/uploads/systemfiles/HirschUrbanWarfare.pdf>].
- 8 A perusal of humanitarian aid websites demonstrates that the world is filled with many other humanitarian crises, most often precipitated by “liberation movements,” organized crime syndicates, or militant Islamist groups. Some fit all these criteria; International Rescue Committee [<https://www.rescue.org/>]; Humanitarian Crises to Know About Right Now | Save the Children [<https://www.savethechildren.org/us/charity-stories/humanitarian-crises-you-need-to-know-about>]; Humanitarian Emergencies Around the World | USA for UNHCR [<https://www.unrefugees.org/emergencies/>]; Humanitarian Emergencies [<https://www.unfpa.org/emergencies>].
- 9 For an excellent collection of these conversations contextualized historically, see *B'Rega HaEmet*.

Consider the following record of correspondence and meetings between the Rebbe and Israeli Prime Ministers:

The Rebbe's correspondence with David Ben-Gurion, *Igros Kodesh*, Vol. 18, pp. 209-215, Letters #6,714, #6,715; Menachem Begin's audience with the Rebbe, *Sichos Kodesh* 5737 (1976-7), Vol. 2, pp. 669-673; <https://ashreinu.app/player?parentEvent=2449&event=2450>; <https://videos.jem.tv/video-player?clip=694>; for Yitzchak Shamir's relationship, see <https://videos.jem.tv/video-player?clip=694>; for Yitzchak Rabin's relationship, see <https://videos.jem.tv/video-player?clip=694>; for Ariel Sharon's reflections, see <https://videos.jem.tv/video-player?clip=694>; for the Rebbe's correspondence with Sharon, see *Igros Kodesh*, Vol. 27, p. 208f., Letter #10,201, 12 Elul 5728 (1968); Vol. 32, p. 314, Letter #12,213, 18 Av 5730 (1970); *Karasi V'Ein Oneh*, Vol. 2, pp. 431-434, 450-452; for Benjamin Netanyahu's reflections on the impact the Rebbe had upon him, see <https://videos.jem.tv/video-player?clip=694> and *B'Rega HaEmet*, Ch. 14; The Essence of Things – Benjamin Netanyahu – Program One Hundred Twenty Eight – Living Torah [https://www.chabad.org/therebbe/livingtorah/player_cdo/aid/471241/jewish/The-Essence-of-Things.htm]; Truth vs. Darkness in the United Nations – Chabad.org [https://www.chabad.org/therebbe/article_cdo/aid/1394394/jewish/Truth-vs-Darkness-in-the-United-Nations.htm]; Don't Be Intimidated – Program

Two Hundred Sixty Seven – Living Torah [https://www.chabad.org/therebbe/livingtorah/player_cdo/aid/1001699/jewish/Dont-Be-Intimidated.htm]; records of some of the Rebbe's meetings and correspondences with Netanyahu include *Toras Menachem – Hisvaaduyos* 5748 (1987-8), Vol. 2, p. 614, and *Likkut Maanos Kodesh* 5748, p. 88.

10 *Karasi V'Ein Oneh* is an excellent collection of primary sources.

11 The Rebbe explicitly clarifies that while some erroneously conflated his positions with those of the religious Zionist Gush Emunim movement, or the radical nationalism of Meir Kahana, in fact, the Rebbe did not fully agree with either of their views. While he may have agreed with both on certain practical points, the Rebbe stresses that his holistic position and those of Gush Emunim and Kahana proceed from different principles.

Therefore, to properly assess the approach, one must understand the principles upon which it is based. See Letter to Mr. Peter Kalms, 13 Shvat 5741 (1981); *Karasi V'Ein Oneh*, Vol. 2, pp. 492, 496. For further exploration of the theoretical divergence between the Rebbe's views and those of Gush Emunim and Kahanism, see *Da'as Torah*, Ch. 1.

Moreover, the Rebbe explains that he does not unreservedly support any political party or political orientation. Instead, his sole allegiance is to policies in line with the Torah values of *pikuach nefesh* (saving lives) and the Land's sanctity. As he clarified in a Letter to Rabbi Immanuel Jakobovits, 3rd Light of Chanukah 5741 (1980), p. 6: "Since... the sole deciding factor is *pikuach nefesh*, it is quite irrelevant what political orientation or party the rabbi issuing the *psak din* subscribes to." See *Petakim MiShulchano Shel HaRabbi*, Vol. 1, p. 274, where the Rebbe criticizes the Likud, an ostensibly "right wing" party, for their territorial concessions.

12 See *Igros Kodesh*, Vol. 33, p. 49, Letter #12,266 to Israeli poet, journalist, and politician Uri Tzvi Greenberg, 22 Sivan 5738 (1978); *Karasi V'Ein Oneh*, Vol. 2, p. 465.

13 Birobidzhan – Wikipedia [<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Birobidzhan>]; UNRWA'S TEACHERS OF HATE [<https://unwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/2022-Report-UNRWAs-Teachers-of-Hate.pdf>], p. 29.

14 The Rebbe particularly stresses this point in his correspondence with Rabbi Immanuel Jakobovits, former Chief Rabbi of the United Kingdom. We have reprinted the original letters in this book's appendices, courtesy of JEM; some of the letters are also available in English in Kalms, P. (2001). *Guidance from the Rebbe: Personal Recollections 1961-1993, 5721-5733*, the Shamir Publishing House, p. 103f., pp. 131-138. This correspondence is also printed with explanatory notes in Rebbe Responsa, Issue 25; see also *Karasi V'Ein Oneh*, Vol. 2, pp. 483-503, for a Hebrew translation. This point is also amply developed in the Rebbe's *sichos*; see, for example, *Karasi V'Ein Oneh*, Vol. 1, pp. 110-111, Simchas Torah 5736 (1975); pp. 182-184, Second Day of Shavuos 5737 (1977); pp. 214-216, Motzaei Shabbos Vayitzei 5738 (1977); pp. 251-253, Purim 5738 (1978); pp. 271-274, Motzaei Shabbos Tzav 5738 (1978); Vol. 2, pp. 6-9, Erev Shabbos Vayetzei 5740 (1979); pp. 23-24, 10 Shvat 5740; pp. 27-30, *Mishpatim* 5740 (1980); pp. 53-54, *Ki Sissa* 5740 (1980); pp. 60-61, *Vayakhel-Pekudei* 5740 (1980); pp. 122-126, *Tzav* 5741 (1981); pp. 162-165, Simchas Torah 5742 (1981); pp. 363, 367, *Chayei Sarah* 5746 (1985); pp. 409-410, *Yechidus* with Sadigura Rebbe; pp. 484-498, Letters to various recipients. See also *Da'as Torah*, p. 8, Ch. 6, and throughout that work.

15 Meta-halachic principles are not the legal principles themselves, but instead, underlying principles that frame how we observe *halachah*. Peace is one such key principle. The value of human life is another. See *Halachah and Meta-Halachic Considerations – Chabad.org* [https://www.chabad.org/multimedia/video_cdo/aid/3894343/jewish/Halachah-and-Meta-Halachic-Considerations.htm].

16 *Karasi V'Ein Oneh*, Vol. 1, p. 131, 19 Kislev 5736 (1975); p. 387, 19 Kislev 5739 (1978); Vol. 2, p. 85, *Shlach* 5780 (1980); p. 207, 24 Teves 5742 (1982).

17 *Karasi V'Ein Oneh*, Vol. 2, p. 294, 13 Tishrei 5743 (1982): "This will also benefit the opposing side... when there is no need for war [as a result of the Jewish people standing strong], there will be no one killed or injured on the opposing side"; see there, p. 298: "Behaving in this way [i.e., with military vigilance] will also bring blessing to our opponents, and we will not injure them at all, because 'they will flee on seven paths before us'"; see also *Toras Menachem* 5743, Vol. 1, pp. 136, 139; <https://ashreinu.page.link/nHGP>.

18 Genesis 1:27.

19 *Toras Menachem – Hisvaaduyos* 5742, Vol. 3, p. 1727; *Karasi V'Ein Oneh*, Vol. 2, p. 240, 3 Tammuz 5742 (1982); Audio of *Sichah* [<https://ashreinu.app/player?parentEvent=3885&event=3890>] 42:17-42:50.

20 *Berachos* 10a.

21 *Sichos Kodesh* 5742, Vol. 4, p. 2171ff., 13 Elul 5742; for a similar application, see also *Likkutei Sichos*, Vol. 7, p. 188ff.; Vol. 27, p. 191ff.

22 See, for example, this book length analysis of Israel's response to the Second Intifada, which explains how Israel did not respond until there was sufficient international outrage over a Passover suicide bombing; Laslovi, O. (2022). *Operation Protective Edge: From Tolerance to Resolution*, Ministry of Defense.

23 For a retelling of this unfortunate cycle, see *Toras Menachem – Hisvaaduyos* 5742, Vol. 4, pp. 1853-1854, 13 Tammuz; *Karasi V'Ein Oneh*, Vol. 2, p. 276; Video of *Sichah* [<https://videos.jem.tv/video-player?clip=11958>]; Recording of *Sichah* [<https://ashreinu.app/player?parentEvent=3893&event=3897>].

24 As we will see, while this is a very kind mode of thinking, it ultimately leads to more death. In the words of the famed military theorist Claude von Clausewitz:

Kind-hearted people might of course think there was some ingenious way to disarm or defeat an enemy without too much bloodshed, and might imagine this is the true goal of the art of war. Pleasant as it sounds, it is a fallacy that must be exposed: war is such a dangerous business that the mistakes which come from kindness are the very worst.

Clausewitz, C. (1976). *On War*, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton University Press, p. 75.

25 Consider that Hamas has openly threatened to repeat attacks like October 7 in the future; see Hamas official vows to 'repeat' Oct 7 attack repeatedly to teach Israel a lesson – The Economic Times [<https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/hamas-official-vows-to-repeat-oct-7-attack-repeatedly-to-teach-israel-a-lesson/articleshow/104903949.cms?from=mdr>]; Hamas Official: We Will Repeat October 7 Attacks Until Israel Is Annihilated [<https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2023-11-01/ty-article/hamas-official-we-will-repeat-october-7-attacks-until-israel-is-annihilated/0000018b-8b9d-db7e-af9b-ebdfbee90000>]; 'Oct. 7 was just a rehearsal,' warns Sinwar – JNS.org [<https://www.jns.org/oct-7-was-just-a-rehearsal-warns-sinwar/>].

26 Eitan, R., & Goldstein, D. (1985). *Rafal: A Soldier's Story*, Maariv, p. 213; cited in *B'Rega HaEmet*, p. 303, fn. 12. See also *Shalom Shalom V'Ein Shalom*, pp. 266-268.

27 On the PLO using a ceasefires to regroup, see *Shalom Shalom V'Ein Shalom*, p. 171. In August 1981, Israel agreed to a ceasefire with the PLO. The PLO used the opportunity to upgrade its fighting capabilities, and violated the ceasefire agreement innumerable times. This allowed the PLO to strengthen itself for the First Lebanon War, beginning in June 1982, where it again violated ceasefire agreements countless times, a point we will explore at greater length.

- 28 *Sefer HaSichos* 5746, Vol. 1, p. 721; *Toras Menachem – Hisvaaduyos* 5746, Vol. 1, p. 613; *Karasi V'Ein Oneh*, Vol. 2, p. 363, *Chayei Sarah* 5746 (1985). In the Rebbe's words there:
Egypt made the strategic decision to receive everything it wanted, territory, oil wells, without sacrificing a single soldier! They know that achieving their ultimate ends will take time, but they realize that they should arm themselves with patience, and ultimately they will receive everything they want.
- 29 *Karasi V'Ein Oneh*, Vol. 1, p. 38, *Matos-Maasei* 5730; p. 41, *Eikev* 5730 (1970).
- 30 Tamil Tigers used truce to rearm, says former commander | World news | The Guardian [<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/apr/04/srilanka>].
- 31 For an early articulation of terrorist strategy, much of which still holds true today, see Trinquier, R. (1964). *Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency*.
- 32 Consider also the Irish terrorist group, the IRA (Irish Republican Army), as well as the Colombian terrorist group, FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia).
- 33 Interfaith Relations in the Quranic Tradition – Jewish Policy Center [<https://www.jewishpolicycenter.org/2020/04/06/interfaith-relations-in-the-quranic-tradition/>].
 For further applications in our context, see MacEoin, D. (2008). *Tactical Hudna and Islamist Intolerance*, Middle East Quarterly, 39, *Tactical Hudna and Islamist Intolerance* [<http://www.meforum.org/1925/tactical-hudna-and-islamist-intolerance>]; see also From Yassin to Sinwar: Hamas' Leaders Sell Lies of Peace while they Prepare for War [<https://mida.org.il/2018/10/07/ומתכננים למלחמה/על-שלוש-ומתכננים-למלחמה>]: for a thesis arguing that the *hudna* doctrine can lead to a lasting peace; see also Winning the Strategic Narrative in the Israeli-Palestinian Protracted Conflict [<https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA574789.pdf>]. While this work is optimistic, it does not align with the way in which Hamas has thus far applied the concept of *hudna*.
- 34 *Hudna* – Wikipedia [<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hudna>].
- 35 *Treaty of al-Hudaybiya* – Wikipedia [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_al-Hudaybiya#].
- 36 Interfaith Relations in the Quranic Tradition – Jewish Policy Center [<https://www.jewishpolicycenter.org/2020/04/06/interfaith-relations-in-the-quranic-tradition/>].
 On weaponizing ceasefires, consider also *Shalom Shalom V'Ein Shalom*, p. 208.
- 37 Karsh, E. (2016). *The Oslo Disaster*, Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies; retrieved from JSTOR [<https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep04764.5>], p. 12.
- 38 See Tepas, M. E. (2009). *A Look at Traditional Islam's General Discord with a Permanent System of Global Cooperation*, Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, 16(2), pp. 698-700. Micah Goodman makes the incredible argument that given this cultural context, from a pragmatic perspective, Israel should accept that no agreement with the Palestinians will ever be final, but should instead be viewed as inherently temporary. He then draws the conclusion that this is a good thing and will ultimately allow for an ethical, realistic resolution to the conflict; see Goodman, M. (2017). *Malkod* 67, pp. 141-142.
- 39 Conveniently cited at *Hudna* – Wikipedia [<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hudna>]. However, Hamas leaders have frequently offered similar *hudnas* with similar conditions. For many examples, see *Between Hudna and Crackdown: Assessing the Record of Hamas Ceasefires* | The Washington Institute [<https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/between-hudna-and-crackdown-assessing-record-hamas-ceasefires>].
- 40 See Article 2 of the Hamas Charter; Hamas in 2017: The document in full | Middle East Eye [<https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/hamas-2017-document-full>].
- 41 For extensive analysis of *hudna* and the treaty of Hudaybiyah in the context of

Hamas, see Hamas's Concept of a Long-term Ceasefire: A Viable Alternative to Full Peace? [https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/144215/Hamas's_Concept_of_a_Long-term_Ceasefire.pdf]. It's important to note that this is not how all iterations of Islam understand the concept of *hudna* and the Treaty of Hudaibiyah in this way. However, the PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization) and Hamas, Israel's most constant adversaries, have used this reasoning in their conflict with Israel, and it is something that we must take seriously.

42 War of Attrition – Wikipedia [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War_of_Attrition].

43 *Sichos Kodesh* 5730, Vol 2, p. 480ff.; *Toras Menachem* 5730, Vol. 4, p. 160; *Tzav* 5738, p. 272; *Karasi V'Ein Oneh*, Vol. 1, pp. 38-40, *Matos-Maasei* 5730 (1970).

44 At different points in World War II, various Nazi officials, such as Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop (1941) and Reichsmarschall (Commander in Chief) Hermann Göring (1943), reached out to the Allies offering a negotiated peace treaty. The Allies rejected all such offers, demanding unconditional surrender. See Weitz, J. (1992). *Hitler's diplomat: The life and times of Joachim von Ribbentrop*, p. 174; Beevor, A. (2012). *The Second World War*, pp. 550-551.

45 See *Sichos Kodesh* 5734, Vol. 1, *Noach*, p. 16; *Karasi V'Ein Oneh*, Vol. 1, p. 70, *Noach* 5734.

46 Isaiah 50:2; see *Sichos Kodesh* 5730, Vol. 2, p. 460-4; *Toras Menachem* 5730, Vol. 4, p. 155, fn. 98, *Karasi V'Ein Oneh*, Vol. 1, p. 44, *Eikev* 5730 (1970).

47 *Karasi V'Ein Oneh*, Vol. 2, p. 221, 22 Sivan 5742 (1982). See *Shalom Shalom V'Ein Shalom*, pp. 266-268, which discusses Brigadier General Amos Baram's protests against the ceasefire with the PLO in Lebanon: "Security personnel protest the ceasefire in Lebanon, arguing that it is a serious military error which will endanger Israel in the future." History proved this to be the case, as terror organizations in Lebanon only became stronger.

48 *Sichos Kodesh* 5729, Vol. 1, pp. 436-441, Purim (1969); *Toras Menachem – Hisvaaduyos* 5729, Vol. 2, pp. 357-363; see The Lubavitcher Rebbe on the Way to Combat Terrorism [<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IWOACDZHwwk&list=PLkXcDdOrqRird5k5aYocVFZ7NlZN39azU&index=6> or <https://videos.jem.tv/video-player?clip=3574>] for an excerpt.

49 See Exodus 9:20.

50 Exodus 1:8; see *Rashi's* commentary there. The Rebbe means to say that in the long-winded process that the international community goes through when judging a case, leadership and policy inevitably change, often automatically resolving diplomatic issues. Therefore, Israel should just act in its own interests and create facts on the ground.

51 Psalms 121:4.

52 Suez Crisis, 1956 [<https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/lw/97179.htm>]; Suez Crisis – Wikipedia [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Suez_Crisis].

53 Gamal Abdel Nasser – Wikipedia [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gamal_Abdel_Nasser].

54 President Eisenhower threatened to destroy the British economy, leading the United Kingdom to withdraw – Katz, D. J. (2013). *Waging Financial War*, The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters, 43(4), 77-85 [<https://press.armywarcollege.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2956&context=parameters>].

55 United Nations Emergency Force – Wikipedia [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_Emergency_Force]; FIRST UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE (UNEF I) [<https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/past/unefi.html>].

56 Similarly, after the Yom Kippur War, Egypt violated its ceasefire agreement with Israel by moving forces into Sinai. U.N. peacekeeping forces were present, but did not stop the Egyptian advance. See *Shalom Shalom V'Ein Shalom*, pp. 231-233. For the terms of the agreement, see Egyptian – Israeli Agreement on Disengagement of Forces

in Pursuance of the Geneva Peace Conference (Sinai I) | UN Peacemaker [<https://peacemaker.un.org/egyptisrael-disengagementforces74>].

57 *Karasi V'Ein Oneh*, Vol. 1, p. 39, *Matos-Maasei* 5730 (1970).

58 Although Egypt and Israel are technically not at war, in Chapter 2, we will explore why the peace treaty is unstable and has very much hurt Israel in the past and the present.

59 Coastal Road massacre – Wikipedia [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coastal_Road_massacre].

60 Operation Litani | IDF [<https://www.idf.il/en/mini-sites/wars-and-operations/operation-litani/>].

61 United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon – Wikipedia [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_Interim_Force_in_Lebanon]; UNIFIL [<https://unifil.unmissions.org/>].

62 See *Sichos Kodesh* 5738, Vol. 2, pp. 288-289, Pesach Sheini (1978).

63 After being evicted by the local Muslim leadership in response to Israeli bombardment, the PLO leadership fled to Tunisia. They did not return to Israel until Israel invited them back during the 1993 Oslo Accords.

64 U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701.

65 A key point is that the treaty included UNSC Resolution 1701 – that Hezbollah would not be allowed past the Litani River, which is 20 kilometers from the border – and UNIFIL has failed to prevent this. Presently, Hezbollah is openly operating next to the Israeli border.

66 Missiles and Rockets of Hezbollah [<https://missilethreat.csis.org/country/hezbollahs-rocket-arsenal/>]; List of military equipment of Hezbollah – Wikipedia [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_military_equipment_of_Hezbollah].

Or, for the words of Hezbollah-affiliated Al-Ahed News, see The Al-Aqsa Deluge: Has "Israel" lost its job [<https://alahednews.com.lb/article.php?id=62266&cid=185>]:

Now, over the course of the 23 years since the Israeli army left Lebanon, the resistance has been accumulating its strength and adding to its experiences every day. The most important thing is that the entity [i.e., Israel] will turn into a geography besieged by a belt of fire from all directions, which will destroy the origin of the idea on which it was founded, which is immigration to Palestine. In the eyes of many settlers, the "promised" land is no longer a promised land, nor a land of peace, nor a land of prosperity, so why do they continue living in it?

Note that in this context, the term "settlers" refers to all Israelis living in the entire Land of Israel.

67 The Third Lebanon War: Target Lebanon | INSS [<https://www.inss.org.il/publication/the-third-lebanon-war-target-lebanon/>].

68 *Sichos Kodesh* 5739, Vol. 1, p. 112, 13 Tishrei (1978); Recording of *Sichah* [<https://ashreinu.page.link/HDua>].

69 The Rebbe notes that, under Israeli rule, Arabs can expect a better quality of life than they would receive in any of the surrounding countries. Relative to Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon, Israel has the highest standard of living. It boasts a strong economy, advanced healthcare system, and high life expectancy. Arabs in Israel can also expect a higher yearly income than Arabs in other countries in the region; see *Karasi V'Ein Oneh*, Vol. 1, p. 62, *sichos of Bamidbar* and *Naso* 5733 (1973). Moreover, relative to other countries in the region such as Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq, Arabs are less likely to die in war in Israel, especially civil war. It is also the only country in the area where Muslims have full

freedom of religion, with the right to practice whatever version of Islam they like; on this point, see Alexander, S. (2013, March 3). *Reactionary philosophy*, Slate Star Codex [<https://slatestarcodex.com/2013/03/03/reactionary-philosophy-in-an-enormous-planet-sized-nutshell/>].

70 *Karasi V'Ein Oneh*, Vol. 1, pp. 320-321, *Re'eh* 5738. More broadly, the Rebbe argued that such forces undermine Jewish sovereignty; see *Sichos Kodesh* 5741, Vol. 1, pp. 14-15, 19 Tishrei; <https://videos.jem.tv/video-player?clip=12530>; International Peacekeeping Force In Israel? Absolutely Not! | The Lubavitcher Rebbe [<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GLqxT3G4z68>].

71 U.N. chief “shocked” at Hamas attack tunnels, condemns rocket fire – BICOM [<https://www.bicom.org.uk/news/22692/>].

72 U.N. chief rejects Israel accusations he justified Hamas attacks | Reuters [<https://www.reuters.com/world/un-chief-says-false-accuse-him-justifying-hamas-attacks-2023-10-25/>].

73 *Karasi V'Ein Oneh*, Vol. 1, p. 88, *Naso* 5734 (1974).

74 Rwandan Patriotic Front – Wikipedia [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rwandan_Patriotic_Front].

75 For a strategic analysis of why foreign ceasefires and international intervention often prolong suffering, see Luttwak, E. N. (1999). *Give War a Chance*, Foreign Affairs, 78(4), pp. 36-44; *Give War a Chance* | Foreign Affairs [<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/1999-07-01/give-war-chance>].

76 Leviticus 26:6.

77 See *Taanis* 22a.

78 See *Igros Kodesh*, Vol. 32, p. 190, Letter #12,105 to IDF Captain Shimon Vajim, dated 11 Nissan 5737 (1977); p. 191, Letter #12,106 to Shimon Peres, dated 13 Nissan 5737 (1977). Peres would go on to become interim Prime Minister of Israel the following week. See also *Sichos Kodesh*, 5727, Vol. 1, p. 197, 19 Kislev (1966); *Sichos Kodesh* 5730, Vol. 1, p. 135, Simchas Torah (1969); *Karasi V'Ein Oneh*, Vol. 1, p. 473, *Devarim* 5739 (1979); *Karasi V'Ein Oneh*, Vol. 2, p. 225, 22 Sivan 5742 (1982); p. 245, 7 Tammuz 5742 (1982); p. 284, 18 Elul 5742 (1982).

79 Biden Says Two State Solution Is Needed for Peace in Israel [<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-TVSePFCJ4Y>]; Opinion | Joe Biden: U.S. won't back down from the challenge of Putin and Hamas – The Washington Post [<https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/11/18/joe-biden-gaza-hamas-putin/>].

80 Blinken Says Two-State Solution Is Still Best Option for Peace [<https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/israel-hamas-war-gaza-hostages-2023-11-28/card/blinken-says-two-state-solution-is-still-best-option-for-peace-TOX54jEylG2khrbopIQ0>].

81 Guterres: It is long past time to move in a determined, irreversible way towards a two-State solution | United Nations in Türkiye [<https://turkiye.un.org/en/254149-guterres-it-long-past-time-move-determined-irreversible-way-towards-two-state-solution>].

82 Vladimir Putin stresses two-state solution to Israeli-Palestinian conflict [https://www.business-standard.com/article/international/vladimir-putin-stresses-two-state-solution-to-israeli-palestinian-conflict-121112400061_1.html].

83 Israel-Gaza war: only a two-state solution can bring real peace, China president says in first public speech on conflict [<https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3242369/israel-gaza-war-only-two-state-solution-can-bring-real-peace-china-president-says-first-public>]. In his words: “The fundamental way out of the recurring Palestinian-Israeli conflicts is to implement the two-state solution, establish an

- independent State of Palestine, and achieve peaceful coexistence between Palestine and Israel”; fmprc.gov [https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/202310/t20231019_11164182.html].
- 84 The less influential socialist PFLP (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine) and PFLP-GC (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command), as well as the affiliated Jihad Jibril Brigades, also feature an image of the entire landmass of the State of Israel in their emblems. The non-military Palestinian Land Authority, a subsidiary of the Palestinian Authority, the Palestinian organization that administers the West Bank, also features Israel’s entire landmass in its logo [https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=426179786318158&set=a.250215433914595&locale=ru_RU].
- 85 Goodman, M. (2017). *Malkod* 67, p. 124, fn. 64.
- 86 Hamas in 2017: The document in full | Middle East Eye [<https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/hamas-2017-document-full>].
- 87 As Tomas Pueyo, an influential contemporary analyst, explains, this refers to Mandatory Palestine, Israel, Gaza, and the West Bank. [Tomas Pueyo is a geographically-minded data analyst and writer, recognized for his insightful and impactful geographical analyses on global issues.]
- 88 *Sichos Kodesh* 5730, Vol. 2, p. 460-3; *Karasi V’Ein Oneh*, Vol. 1, p. 42, *Eikev* 5730 (1970); pp. 50-51, *Noach* 5731 (1970).
- 89 Tayseer Abu Sneineh – Wikipedia [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tayseer_Abu_Sneineh].
- 90 Tayseer Abu Sneinah, one of the perpetrators of the Al-Dabweya operation, explains its details [<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VUY1ScAWghE&list=PLYYBIsai7GRh5BRbDnWpsQTHyJhIcvtfc>]. [This clip features Abu Sneineh offering a tour (in Arabic) where he proudly recounts the terrorist attack to Palestinians, particularly youth.]
- 91 Antisemitic remarks by Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas | E-002606/2023 | European Parliament [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-9-2023-002606_EN.html].
- 92 Abbas: Palestinian people have the right to defend themselves | Reuters [<https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSS8N3AU0AU/>]; Abbas stresses Palestinian right to defence after Hamas op [<https://www.newarab.com/news/abbas-stresses-palestinian-right-defence-after-hamas-op>]; President Abbas stresses right of Palestinians to defend themselves [<https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/president-abbas-stresses-right-of-palestinians-to-defend-themselves/3010441>].
- 93 Battle of Gaza (2007) – Wikipedia [[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Gaza_\(2007\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Gaza_(2007))]; Fatah–Hamas conflict – Wikipedia [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fatah-Hamas_conflict]. Elections were held in both Gaza and Judea and Samaria. In Judea and Samaria, Hamas initially had less support and could not take control, in part due to Israeli military backing for the Palestinian Authority. This support, along with Israel’s capacity to intervene in these territories, played a role in maintaining the Palestinian Authority’s rule there.
- 94 Henry Kissinger’s (Maybe) Last Interview: Drop the Two-State Solution – POLITICO [<https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2023/12/02/henry-kissinger-interview-israel-hamas-war-00129374>]. Even Henry Kissinger, a one-time proponent of the two-state solution, said that by 2023, Hamas’ conduct in Gaza has proven that this is practically untenable.
- 95 Al Ahed (Lebanon newspaper) – Wikipedia [[العهد \(جريدة لبنانية\) - ويكيبيديا \(wikipedia.org\)](https://ar.wikipedia.org/wiki/العهد_(جريدة_لبنانية) - ويكيبيديا)].

- 96 <https://www.almanar.com.lb>.
- 97 <https://alahednews.com.lb/article.php?id=62024&cid=185>.
- 98 Iran's "verbal" war against Israel continues – analysis – The Jerusalem Post [<https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/iran-news/article-697050>].
- 99 Iranian press review: Pro-government media celebrates Hamas rocket strikes | Middle East Eye [<https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/iranian-press-review-farsi-media-divide-over-israels-bombardment-gaza#:~:text=The%20conservative%20Kayhan%20daily%20also,into%20hell%20for%20the%20Zionists>].
- 100 Osama bin Laden, Letter to the American People, p. 3. In his vision, Bin-Laden saw no homeland for the Jewish people.
- 101 Consider the 1517 Hebron and Safed Attacks, the 1834 Safed Plunder, and the 1840 Damascus affair; History of the Jews under Muslim rule – Wikipedia [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_the_Jews_under_Muslim_rule_-_Wikipedia].
- 102 This indicates that the sexual violence on October 7 is not an exception in Arab violence towards Jews.
- 103 The pogroms continued. Consider the notable Jaffa riots (April 1936) [[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jaffa_riots_\(April_1936\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jaffa_riots_(April_1936))].
- 104 War of Independence | IDF [<https://www.idf.il/en/mini-sites/wars-and-operations/war-of-independence/>].
- 105 Note: In neither case did Israel conquer the land from "Palestinians," but rather from hostile neighboring states who did not intend to turn these tracts of land into Palestine. Palestinian national identity became a major Arab weapon against Israel following the Yom Kippur War in 1973.
- 106 Second Intifada – Wikipedia [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Intifada].
- 107 Fatah's Tanzim and Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades' divisions.
- 108 *Karasi V'Ein Oneh*, Vol. 1, pp. 315-316 Motzaei Shabbos *Pinchas* 5738 (1978); p. 387, 19 Kislev, 5739 (1978); p. 401, Motzaei Shabbos *Mikeitz* 5739 (1978); *Karasi V'Ein Oneh*, Vol. 2, p. 355, Purim 5745 (1985); p. 410 *Yechidus* with Sadigura Rebbe; p. 446, Letter to Rechavam Ze'evi, Rosh Chodesh Adar I, 5730 (1970); pp. 466-467, Letter to an anonymous recipient, Teves 5738 (1978); p. 474, Letter to an anonymous recipient, Chanukah 5740 (1979);
- 109 30.10.2017 Operation Defensive Shield | IDF [<https://www.idf.il/en/mini-sites/wars-and-operations/operation-defensive-shield/>].
- 110 Part of the Oslo agreement was that if the Palestinian authorities did not control terror threats against Israel, Israel could intervene and reassert security control; see Oslo Accords, Article VIII and XIII, available at kneset.gov [https://web.archive.org/web/20021115183950/http://kneset.gov.il/process/docs/oslo_eng.htm].
- 111 This was a surprising reversal for Sharon who, throughout his long career in the military and politics, had been a staunch advocate of settlement policy.
- 112 *Toras Menachem – Hisvaaduyos* 5742, Vol. 2, pp. 679-680; *Karasi V'Ein Oneh*, Vol. 1, p. 290, Lag BaOmer 5738 (1978); Vol. 2, p. 203, 24 Teves 5742 (1982). There, the Rebbe argues that the Camp David Accords were an incremental tool to slowly carve away at Israeli territory. As he put it:

When they signed the Camp David agreements, the Egyptians made it known that they would not raise future Arab claims. [Initially, they needed to gain whatever they could through exerting pressure. This pressure was immaterial, akin to the "sound of a leaf blowing in the wind" (Leviticus 26:36). If the Israelis had stood strong, the pressure would have ceased to exist.] Yet, we must be aware, the claims of 100

million Arabs still stand. And their demand is that we return to the 1967 borders, including giving away the Old City of Jerusalem, and only then will they consider what else they can demand!

The Rebbe's assertions are amply backed by the explicit statements of Israel's enemies. In the words of one Fatah journalist, "The Palestinians' ultimate goal, and Fatah is included in this, is to incrementally neutralize the State of Israel. Peace agreements are tools used to weaken Israel's ability to withstand the Arab world"; cited in Hacham, D. (2016). Gaza in the eye of the storm: The inside story of the Intifada. p. 196.

113 How the Palestinian Authority Failed Its People – The Atlantic [<https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2023/10/palestinian-authority-gaza-hamas/675695/>]; Corrupt, discredited: could a reformed Palestinian Authority run Gaza? [<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/nov/27/corrupt-discredited-could-a-reformed-palestinian-authority-run-gaza>]; The Palestinian Authority's corruption and its impact on the peace process [<https://jcpa.org/article/the-palestinian-authoritys-corruption-and-its-impact-on-the-peace-process/>].

114 The leaders and their children might financially benefit from cooperating with Israel. This monetary support comes partly from Israel but mainly from international aid; since they are not labeled as terrorists, they are able to receive funds from countries such as the United States.

115 Strikingly, the PA has committed to paying the families of slain October 7 terrorists; PA to immediately reward families of Oct. 7 terrorists with nearly \$3 million – JNS.org [<https://www.jns.org/pa-to-immediately-reward-families-of-oct-7-terrorists-with-nearly-3m/#:~:text=The%20Palestinian%20Authority%20will%20pay,7%2C%20Palestinian%20Media%20Watch%20reports>].

116 The Resurgence of Armed Groups in the West Bank and Their Connections to Gaza [<https://acleddata.com/2023/12/14/the-resurgence-of-armed-groups-in-the-west-bank-and-their-connections-to-gaza/>].

117 *Igros Kodesh*, Vol. 26, pp. 44-47, Letter #9,613, Letter to Rabbi Shlomo Yosef Zevin, Kislev 5729 (1968); also printed in *Karasi V'Ein Oneh*, Vol. 2, pp. 437-439; *Sichos Kodesh* 5740, Vol. 3, p. 1157, *Yechidus* with *Sadigura Rebbe* (1980); *Karasi V'Ein Oneh*, Vol. 1, p. 24, *Matos-Maasei* 5729 (1969); see Johnston's Archive [<https://www.johnstonsarchive.net/>] for a comprehensive list of terrorist attacks across Israel's history.

118 In the Hamas-Fatah civil war, over 600 Palestinians killed one another. The tensions have been ongoing since then; <https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3409548,00.html>. Moreover, since taking control of Gaza, Hamas has sentenced 180 Palestinians to death, and has killed many others extrajudicially.

119 Between 1967 and 2005, Israeli security forces killed Palestinians in the low thousands. These killings were aimed at terrorists, but came with collateral damage. Between 2005 and 2024, Israel has killed many times that number, as a result of its being forced to retaliate in order to quell Hamas attacks.

120 *Sichos Kodesh* 5740, Vol. 3, pp. 1157, *Yechidus* with *Sadigura Rebbe* (1980); *Sichos Kodesh* 5746, Vol. 2, pp. 261, 266, *Motzaei Zos Chanukah* (1985).

121 See the Hamas Charter which says things such as:

1) "Hamas" is a Palestinian Islamic national liberation and resistance movement. Its goal is to liberate Palestine and confront the Zionist project. Its frame of reference is Islam.

2) Palestine extends from the River Jordan in the east to the Mediterranean in the west, and from Ras al-Naqurah in the north to Umm al-Rashrah in the south.

[This is basically present-day Israel, Gaza, and the West Bank, excluding the Golan Heights - thanks to Tomas Pueyo for this observation.]

3) *Palestine is an Arab-Islamic land.*

10) *Jerusalem is the capital of Palestine. Its Islamic and Christian holy places belong exclusively to the Palestinian people and to the Arab and Islamic Ummah. Not one stone of Jerusalem can be surrendered or relinquished. The measures undertaken by the occupiers in Jerusalem, such as Judaisation, settlement building, and establishing facts on the ground, are fundamentally null and void.*

Hamas in 2017: The document in full | Middle East Eye [<https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/hamas-2017-document-full>].

122 *Karasi V'Ein Oneh*, Vol. 2, p. 298, 13 Tishrei 5743 (1982); p. 365, *Chayei Sarah* 5746 (1985).

123 *Sichos Kodesh* 5746, Vol. 2, pp. 261, 266, Motzaei Zos Chanukah (1985); *Toras Menachem - Hisvaaduyos* 5749, p. 95; *Karasi V'Ein Oneh*, Vol. 2, p. 389, *Haazinu* 5749 (1988).

124 On the Israeli government tacitly allowing its citizens to be killed, see *sichos Kodesh* 5746, Vol. 2, pp. 259, 261, 262, Motzaei Zos Chanukah (1985). Video of *Sichah* available at The Lubavitcher Rebbe Unfiltered | Terrorism | Party Politics | Peace Treaties [<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NB97MScOOaI>] and <https://videos.jem.tv/video-player?produced=2860>. The Rebbe discusses this view at length in his correspondence with Rabbi Immanuel Jakobovits; see the letter dated 3rd Light of Chanukah 5741, pp. 8-9. See also letter intended for Rabbi Jakobovits dated 13th Shvat 5741, pp. 4-5. For a clear articulation of such an approach, see Goodman, M. (2017). *Malkod* 67, p. 151. Goodman encourages citizens and policy-makers to accept “not absolute security, but existential security.” In simple English, this means that Israel should pursue policies which take into account a certain number of citizens being killed so long as it does not threaten the state’s overall existence. By this reasoning, limited responses and behaving morally justify sacrificing a certain number of citizens each year, so long as the state’s existence is not threatened. Goodman continues to encourage us to ask: “How can we lower terrorism to a tolerable level?” instead of “How can we eliminate it?” In the Rebbe’s view, this thinking is deeply problematic.

125 *Karasi V'Ein Oneh*, Vol. 1, p. 420, Motzaei Shabbos Ki Sissa 5739 (1979). For contemporary evidence of this, see Tomorrow’s Pioneers - Wikipedia [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tomorrow%27s_Pioneers]; Hamas Mickey Mouse Is “Martyred” by Israelis [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m3vGDmdEP_0].

126 Quite literally. As previously mentioned, the Palestinian Authority provides a financial stipend to the families of Palestinian terrorists who die while attacking Jews; PA to immediately reward families of Oct. 7 terrorists with nearly \$3 million - JNS.org [<https://www.jns.org/pa-to-immediately-reward-families-of-oct-7-terrorists-with-nearly-3m/#:-:text=The%20Palestinian%20Authority%20will%20pay,7%2C%20Palestinian%20Media%20Watch%20reports>].

127 For a contemporary illustration of this point, see Judea and Samaria is not Gaza: Olam Katan [<https://olam-katan.co.il/archives/11867>].

In the words of one Israeli officer:

At the beginning of reserve duty, we entered a region where there were many terrorist attacks. The villagers in the area were carrying out stone-throwing attacks several times a week. From the moment we arrived, we decided on a change of policy. On the first night, I informed my commander that every night, I will patrol the village, and apprehend and detain anyone I see walking around suspiciously. Every evening, we entered the village, detained dozens of Arabs, and transferred many of

them to Shin Bet custody. My soldiers already know the village like the back of their hand, as an army should in war. A whole month has passed since then, and there have been zero stone-throwing incidents. We brought the terrorism here down to zero and brought real peace and security to the sector. This happened thanks to all our actions. There can be no dispute about the result; it speaks for itself.

- 128 *Karasi V'Ein Oneh*, Vol. 1, p. 2, *Yechidus* with Tzvi Kaspi.
- 129 *Igros Kodesh*, Vol. 25, p. 254, Letter #9,563 to Major General Chaim Bar-Lev, dated Days of *Selichos* 5728 (1967); *Likkutei Sichos*, Vol. 39, p. 309; *Shalom Shalom V'Ein Shalom*, p. 36.
- 130 *Toras Menachem – Hisvaaduyos* 5743, Vol. 1, p. 139; *Karasi V'Ein Oneh*, Vol. 2, p. 298, 13 *Tishrei* 5743 (1972); Recording of *Sichah* [<https://ashreinu.page.link/nHGP>].
- 131 See *Yechidus* with Ron Pekar, 5735 (1975), cited in *Karasi V'Ein Oneh*, Vol. 1, p. 135.
- 132 https://twitter.com/mohammed_hijab/status/1731281034124095746.
- 133 See, for example, Trinquier, R. (1964). *Modern Warfare: a French View of Counterinsurgency*, available at A French View of Counterinsurgency [<https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/combats-studies-institute/csi-books/Modern-Warfare.pdf>]; see also Luttwak, E. N., & Richard, T. (2006). *Modern war: Counter-insurgency as malpractice*, *Politique étrangère*, 4, 849-861. I.F.R.I. (Modern War: Counter-Insurgency as Malpractice [<https://www.cairn-int.info/revue-politique-etrangere-2006-4-page-849.htm&wt.src=pdf>]).

This excerpt is graciously dedicated by

Blanca Garazi Schoonover,

ברכה בת אסתר,

*with the heartfelt prayer that the light
of redemption will illuminate
the souls of the hostages,
bringing them immediate and
complete freedom from captivity.*